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INTRODUCTION

Are you free to choose the race of your spouse, . . . of your
child, . . . of yourself? Historically, the legal and social answer to these
questions was No. Matters of racial identity and interracial intimacy
were strictly circumscribed by ideologies of racial essentialism and
separation, ostensibly rooted in science, morality, and religion. In
contrast, according to Professor Randall Kennedy1 in his new book,
Interracial Intimacies: Sex, Marriage, Identity, and Adoption, the
answer to all three questions should be a resounding Yes. The exclu
sive source of racial identification and intimacy should be individual
choice, free from legal and social interference. The reality today is
somewhere in between. In matters of sexual and marital intimacy, the
law takes a neutral posture, but significant social constraints remain.
And in matters of adoption and racial identity, both law and social
norms continue, albeit with decreasing fervor, to restrain individual
cboice in service of collective notions of racial appropriateness.
Kennedy challenges remaining obstacles to individual self
determination in matters of interracial intimacy and identity. He takes
a candid look at America's historical and continuing aversion to
intimacy between people of different races, an inquiry that reveals the
* Professor of Law and Barron F. Black Research Professor, University of Virginia;
Director, University of Virginia Center for the Study of Race and Law; Visiting Professor of
Law, University of Michigan (2003-04). A.B. 1990, J.D. 1993, University of Michigan. - Ed.
I am grateful for the helpful comments I received on an earlier draft from Barb Armacost,
Rick Banks, Anne Coughlin, Allen Flynn, Mike Klarman, Clarisa Long, and Buffie Scott, as
well as the participants in the Mid-Atlantic People of Color Legal Scholarship Conference of
2003. I thank Yale Kamisar for suggesting this project. A special thanks to Davern! Swinson
and Will Forde-Mazrui for their diligent research assistance. I dedicate this Review to my
parents, Ali Al'Amin Mazrui and Molly Vickerman Walker, my wife, Kay Forde-Mazrui,
and our son, WillForde-Mazrui, who have taught me the transcendent power of love.
1. Professor of Law, Harvard Law School.
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deep and pathological nature of America's racial ideology. He also
considers the meaning of race and the burdens imposed by essentialist
definitions of race on the identities and intimate relations of those who
would live otherwise. Finally, Kennedy criticizes America's continued
resistance to interracial adoption, particularly involving black and
Native American or Indian2 children, a resistance that, in Kennedy's
view, favors culturalist agendas at the expense of children's welfare.
The book is not, however, pessimistic. It is inspiring. Although
opposition to interracial intimacy has reflected a repugnant and often
brutal ideology of racial hierarchy, interracial relationships have
always developed, revealing the indomitable power of human inti
macy. Moreover, significant progress has occurred in the direction
of racial tolerance. Kennedy hopes this progress will continue, aided
by his book, which aims to "mov[e] interracial intimacy to center stage
as a necessary focus of inquiry for anyone seriously interested in
understanding and improving American society" (p. 12).
Interracial Intimacies will draw criticism from some quarters.
Critics will have difficulty, however, in challenging the scholarliness of
Kennedy's methodology, as he endeavors to take competing perspec
tives seriously, considering their merits with a degree of balance,
precision, detail, and candor on issues which are all too often discussed
in abstract generality and hyperbole. Instead, critics are likely to take
issue with Kennedy's ideology. He is a liberal individualist who consis
tently defends private choice regarding intimacy and identity, against
interference from the state or groups claiming control over personal
intimacy for the sake of communal interests. The most public criticism
will likely come from blacks on the left. Kennedy unflinchingly criti
cizes all justifications for discouraging interracial intimacy, including
claims that multiracial relationships and identities undermine black
cultural and political solidarity. Other likely critics include traditional
racialists, who believe the races are fundamentally distinct and should
not intermingle, particularly in the context of sex, marriage, and adop
tion. Although likely less open in their criticism in today's racial
climate, traditional racialists exist in substantial numbers, as revealed
by polls indicating that one in five white Americans believe interracial
marriage should be illegal.3 Because I largely agree with Kennedy's
ideology, my criticisms are few, and I recommend the book whole
heartedly.

2. Whether Native American people should be referred to as "Native American" or
"Indian" is a matter of controversy. I will use "Indian" in this Review because of the cen
trality of that term to the Indian Child Welfare Act and other legal doctrines addressing
Native American people, and because Kennedy uses the term in the book.

3. See Randall Kennedy, How Are We Doing With Loving?: Race, Law, and
Intermarriage, 77 B.U. L. REV. 815, 820 (1997).

Live and Let Love

May2003 ]

2187

Interracial Intimacies also has important implications beyond race.
The principles advanced by Kennedy in defense of individual freedom
and self-determination in matters of intimacy and identity afford a
basis for evaluating social and legal restrictions on the intimate rela
tions of homosexual4 people. The human ideals of love, trust, and
com�assion that Kennedy advocates and celebrates arguably should
exter..d to those members of our community who happen to fall in love
with people of the same sex. Accordingly, in addition to promoting
racia. tolerance, the lessons of Interracial Intimacies counsel greater
tolerance for intrasexual intimacies.
In Part I, in addition to describing the book, I identify and analyze
Kennedy's core claims about the legitimate role of the state and social
groups in matters of interracial sex, marriage, identity, and adoption.
Although I agree substantially with Kennedy's perspective, I question
his quite radical position that racial identity should be exclusively a
matter of personal choice.5 His position, I argue, is unrealistic at the
present time and, more importantly, threatens to undermine efforts to
remedy the effects of past racial discrimination and to deter present
discrimination. I also criticize Kennedy's opposition to race matching
in adoption as too extreme, in that he would oppose consideration of
race even if evidence persuasively demonstrated that same-race
placements were in general better for black children.6 I broaden my
focus, in Part II, to intimacies between people of the same sex. I argue
that the principles on which Kennedy relies for accepting interracial
intimacies support the acceptance of intrasexual intimacies.

I.

INTERRACIAL INTIMACIES

A.

Sex and Marriage

Kennedy's historical account reveals certain defining features of
America's ideological opposition to interracial sex and marriage. A
principal underlying premise of that opposition was an understanding
of nature and scientific truth. Racial groups were understood as
fundamentally different, and intimate relations between them were
considered unnatural. Those who would engage in such relationships
were commonly believed to be mentally disturbed or overcome
by bestial passion. Another justification for opposing interracial rela
tionships was morality and religious doctrine. In justifying Virginia's
antimiscegenation law, for example, the lower court in Loving v.
4. Whether people who desire sexual or marital intimacy with people of the same sex
should be referred to as "homosexual." "gay and lesbian," or by some other term is outside
the scope of this Review. I mean "intrasexual," "homosexual," "same sex," and "gay and
lesbian" to be interchangeable.
5. See infra Section LC.

6. See infra Section LB.
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Virginia7 explained, "Almighty God created the races white, black,
yellow, malay and red, and he placed them on separate continents. . . .
The fact that he separated the races shows that he did not intend for
the races to mix."8 Similarly, Massachusetts defended its antimiscege
nation law as fulfilling the "Infinite Wisdom" of "God's design."9
Remarkable was the strength and depth of opposition. "[A]mong
white southerners," Kennedy found, "the proscription against interra
cial marriage and sexual intercourse constituted the racial discrimina
tion of greatest importance, and thus the one most in need of defense"
(p. 85). Of all segregationist laws, prohibitions of interracial sex and
marriage were the most numerous and geographically widespread;
among such laws, only blacks were universally barred from marrying
whites. Indeed, every other segregationist law was defended in part on
the need to deter interracial intimacy, and proposals to grant legal
rights to blacks were opposed most effectively with the simple ques
tion, "Do you want your daughter to marry a Negro?"10 Opposition to
interracial relations was also defined by an emotional aversion that
provoked white people on mere suspicion to participate in brutal
lynchings of black men, often involving the mutilation, castration, and
burning of their live bodies. Indeed, the "[i]magery of the black man
as sexual predator . . . helped facilitate the lynching that claimed
between four and five thousand black lives from the 1880s to the
1960s" (p. 192; citations omitted).
An ironic feature of America's ideology has been its preference for
interracial relationships of a purely physical or even coercive nature
over sexual relationships involving genuine affection or, worse, marital
commitment. Several states, such as Louisiana, banned intermarriage
but not interracial sex. And while other states proscribed both sexual
and marital miscegenation, the latter laws were often enforced with
greater rigor. Although in Alabama, for example, interracial fornica
tion was criminally prosecuted, conviction required proof of an
ongoing relationship; occasional sex was not enough. "Tolerant
though it might be of a loveless interracial quickie, or even a commer
cial transaction, Alabama law was intolerant of interracial romance"
(p. 215). And, in general, "[w]hile relations between white men and
black women could be approved of, or at least tolerated, as sexual
exercise or comic diversion, a white man faced sanctions if he revealed
7. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
8. P. 274 (quoting Loving, 388 U.S. at 3 (internal citation and quotation marks omit
ted)).
9. P. 245 (quoting HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 25TH CONG., REPORT
RESPECTING DISTINCTIONS OF COLOR (Feb. 25, 1839), reprinted in LIBERATOR (Mar. 15,
1839) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
10. P. 22 (quoting Alfred Avins, Anti-Miscegenation Laws and the Fourteenth Amend
ment: The Original Intent, 52 VA. L. REV. 1224, 1227 (1966) (internal quotation marks omit
ted)).
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genuine feeling for a black lover or children" (p. 76). As Frederick
Douglas explained, "[w]hat they typically objected to . .. was 'not a
mixture of the races, but honorable marriage between them.' "11
Consider also the controversy surrounding Thomas Jefferson and
Sally Hemings. Jefferson's exalted place in American history has
prevailed despite his direct participation in slavery, yet his reputation
has received its most serious challenge, both during his life and today,
by allegations that he had a sexual relationship with one of his slaves,
especially the possibility that the relationship involved mutual affec
tion. One Jefferson biographer, Dumas Malone, who steadfastly
denied a Jefferson-Hemings affair, eventually conceded that sex be
tween them "might have happened once or twice."1 2 "Unwilling to
admit the barest possibility of an emotionally serious relationship
between his hero and Hemings,'' Kennedy observes, "Malone pre
ferred to posit the alternative of an emotionally barren one-night
stand" (p. 55).
Finally, opposition to interracial sex and marriage has been justi
fied on procreative grounds. Interracial sex, it was feared, would
produce a "mongrel breed" of mentally defective or otherwise geneti
cally inferior children (pp. 270, 274, 298). Defending its ban on inter
racial marriage in 1948, for example, California argued to the state
supreme court that the law protected against the risk of physically and
mentally inferior children. 13 And eugenicist fears prompted a proposal
in New York that would have tolerated racial intermarriage provided
the couple submitted to sterilization (p. 255). One can thus discern, in
reverse order of customary family values, an ascending hierarchy of
interracial wrongs: sex, intimate sex, marriage, and marriage with
children.
Kennedy's inquiry into interracial intimacy in the context of sex
and marriage is detailed, well-documented, and rich in narrative.
Many of his normative claims are implicit in lessons suggested by
the exploration. One lesson that emerges is that the opposition to
interracial sex and marriage has been, and to some extent continues to
be, devastatingly destructive to the lives of those who deign to love
across racial lines. An additional, contrasting lesson is that, despite the
strength of legal and social sanctions, people have sought interracial
intimacy throughout American history. Even in the context of slavery,
"in the least nurturing of soils" (p. 69), genuine intimacy bloomed
between whites and blacks, notwithstanding the risk of familial and
11. P. 74 (quoting WALDO E. MARTIN, JR., MIND OF FREDERICK DOUGLASS 100
(1984) (quoting the OSWEGO RECORD, Feb. 2, 1884) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
12. P. 55 (quoting Scot A. French & Edward L. Ayers, The Strange Career of Thomas
Jefferson: Race and Slavery in American Memory, 1943-1993, in JEFFERSONIAN LEGACIES
418, 444 (Peter S. Onuf ed., 1993) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
13. P. 263 (discussing Perez v. Sharp, 32 Cal. 2d 711 (1948)).
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societal ostracism, criminal punishment, enslavement, and violence.
Such relationships provide an inspiring testament to the strength of
love in the face of collective prohibition:
At every turn, the impulse to maintain a strict, clean, consistent racial
order was confounded by the force and consequences of passion, com
passion, and ingenuity. In the end, the antimiscegenation laws were un
able to ensure or re-create white racial chastity because desire, humanity,

223)
There is also a lesson of hope. Tolerance for interracial sex and
marriage has increased substantially. The law, rightfully, has become
formally permissive, and social antagonisms have lessened signifi
cantly. Between 1960 and 2000, for instance, black-white marriages
increased more than sixfold (p. 126). Accordingly, Kennedy observes,
"despite the black-power backlash and the remnants of white hostility
to 'race mixing,' the most salient fact about interracial intimacies
today is that those involved in them have never been in a stronger
position, or one in which optimism regarding the future was more
realistic" (p. 124). Kennedy desires this trend to continue, envisioning
a world in which neither state, community, nor family discourage
interracial intimacy and, further, that in matters of the heart, individu
als would give no consideration to race in their own personal choices.
Kennedy's vision is one of optimism, a recognition that differences
between people of different races are, ultimately, only skin deep, and
that love genuinely can be color-blind.
and hypocrisy kept getting in the way. (p.

B.

Adoption

Kennedy's most pointed attack on state-sponsored constraints on
interracial intimacy appears in the final chapters on adoption.14 Where
earlier chapters on sex and marriage were more suggestive than
demanding, these chapters advance arguments for immediate legal
change, namely, the abolition of "race matching,'' a policy "which
assigns children a permanent racial identity and requires that they be
raised by adults of the same race" (p. 367). As I have also argued
elsewhere,15 race-matching practices harm the children they are
supposed to help by denying them adoptive parents based on
misguided and unsubstantiated fears over interracial adoption.
In the child-placement context, as with sex and marriage, one can
observe the usual ordering of family values being subordinated to
racial separationism. In Louisiana, for example, a court in the 1950s
refused to permit a black couple to adopt a child because the child was
classified (erroneously) as white, and state law absolutely barred
14. See chapters 9-12.
15. See Kim Forde-Mazrui, Note, Black Identity and Child Placement: The Best Interests
of Black and Biracial Children, 92 MICH. L. REV. 925 (1994).
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transracial adoption.16 The state instead relegated the child to an
orphanage. "The state believed, in other words, that it was better for a
child to be reared in an institution, no matter how bad, than to be
adopted into a family of a different race, no matter how good" (p. 12).
During the same period, a District of Columbia trial court refused to
permit a black man to adopt his wife's nonmarital or "illegitimate"17
white son whom they had raised alongside their two biological
children since marrying.18 The court thus ruled, "in essence, that it
would be better for the boy to remain illegitimate but white than to
become legitimate but black - or, more precisely, to become the legal
son of a black man" (pp. 390-91).
Despite the invalidation of strict race-matching laws in the 1960s,
race matching persists in practice. Such policies are, of course, no
longer officially justified by segregationist ideology, but rather are
defended as necessary to protect the racial identity of black children
and to teach them skills for coping with racism. They are also justified
as necessary to safeguard the interests of black people as a culturally
distinct group. Some proponents of race matching acknowledge the
desirability, in theory, of placing children without regard to race, but
claim that the reality of pervasive racial prejudice justifies preferring
to place black children with black parents. The most ardent propo
nents of race-matching policies are themselves black. The National
Association of Black Social Workers has condemned the transracial
placement of black (and biracial) children with white parents as
"cultural genocide," and have succeeded, through political pressure, in
curtailing the transracial placement of black children.19 Child
placement officials and courts give so much credence to fears over
transracial placement that such placements are routinely denied
notwithstanding constitutional constraints on race-conscious state
action and recent federal law prohibiting delayed or denied adoption
on account of race.20
Kennedy rightfully places the burden on those who oppose trans
racial placement to substantiate the purported risks involved. They
should bear the burden of proof because of the healthy suspicion
about racial discrimination - particularly when done by the state 16. See pp. 8-12 (discussing Green v. City of New Orleans, 88 So. 2d 76 (La. Ct. App.
1956)).
17. I prefer the term "nonmarital" to refer to children born to an unmarried mother
rather than the traditional term "illegitimate," a term which unfairly stigmatizes children for
the conduct of their parents. The courts used the term "illegitimate," however, which serves
to emphasize how negatively they viewed transracial adoptions, as worse for children than
social invalidity.
18. See pp. 390-92 (discussing In re Adoption of a Minor, 228 F.2d 446 (D.C. Cir. 1955),
which reversed the trial court's decision).
19. See pp. 452-53; Forde-Mazrui, supra note 15, at 925.
20. See Inter-Ethnic Placement Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1996b (Supp. II 1997).
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which our society has learned from history. In addition, the serious
and predictable harm to children of having no parents, no one "in
their corner . . . whose primary responsibility, twenty-four hours a day,
is the well-being of his or her charges" (p. 405), further justifies
requiring those who would deny black children parents simply because
their would-be parents are white to demonstrate persuasively that the
risks of transracial placement outweigh the harm of continued
parentlessness. In Kennedy's assessment, race-matching proponents
have failed utterly to make this case.
Kennedy's most palpable skepticism is toward allegations that
white parents are presumptively incompetent to foster an appropriate
or authentic cultural identity in black children. Such arguments, for
Kennedy, represent a form of communal imperialism by blacks who
claim authority over black authenticity. Nor have race-matching
proponents adequately demonstrated that white parents are inferior to
black parents in teaching black children how to cope with race-related
difficulties. The simple observation that some transracial adoptees
experience difficulty over racial issues, and even that some believe
race matching is preferable, fails adequately to recognize that many if
not most black Americans have experienced difficulty over their racial
identity. No consensus among blacks has ever emerged regarding the
most successful strategy for coping with racism; indeed, many blacks
fail to cope successfully, a fact generally ignored by race-matching
proponents who presume the fitness of black parents to raise healthy
racial identities in black children.
Nor are Kennedy's criticisms reserved for state policies involving
black children. He also challenges the Indian Child Welfare Act
("ICWA"),21 which mandates a preference for placing Indian children
with Indian families. Kennedy accuses Congress of having too readily
deferred to claims by some Indians that the placement of Indian
children with non-Indian families is one of the primary threats to the
cultural existence of Indian tribes. The risks to Indian preservation lie
elsewhere, Kennedy believes, in the social and economic problems
that Indian people disproportionately experience, problems from
which ICWA dangerously distracts society's attention. He also
criticizes arguments for Indian cultural preservation as a "rhetorical
bogeyman" (p. 513) that would freeze Indian cultures in time rather
than afford them the benefits of transformation through interaction
with the modern world. Whatever the long-term effects of transracial
placement on Indian cultural concerns, the best interests of individual
Indian children require finding them permanent homes as soon as
possible.
Kennedy would thus prohibit the state from discouraging the
placement of children of any race with parents of a different race. He
21. 25

u.s.c.

§ 1901 (2000).
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would do so, moreover, even assuming black parents were in general
better able to raise black children, although he would permit consid
eration of race where compelling evidence in a specific case justified it,
such as where an older child insisted on being adopted by parents of a
particular race. "Rigorous adherence to this antidiscrimination regime
is an essential requirement for ridding society of the pernicious habit
of submerging individuals in the racial group to which they are said to
belong" (pp. 412-13). He also opposes race matching by private
placement agencies, although the use of state power to enforce race
matching policies raises greater concern for him.
Kennedy recognizes the limited effect of legally proscribing race
matching so long as placement workers and judges vested with broad
discretion believe that transracial placement is harmful. Accordingly,
in addition to legal reform, Kennedy would hope to educate the public
to reduce race-matching practices: "[I]n the long run, the transforma
tion of public opinion is even more important than the transformation
of legal formalities. The judicial system, by itself, will never satisfacto
rily police the conduct of decision makers whose personal aims and
sentiments are in opposition to the law" (p. 376).
Kennedy would, however, permit adoptive parents to pursue their
own racial preferences in adopting, even when using state-sponsored
agencies.22 Although racial preferences by adoptive parents are regret
table and contribute to the underadoption of minority children, the
interests of children and respect for the choices of adoptive parents
counsel against requiring adoptive parents to accept children they do
not want. At least by requiring neutrality toward transracial adoption
on the part of the state, the changes Kennedy advocates would allow a
number of adoptions across racial lines to proceed and may, in the
longer term, contribute to parental interest in adopting black children
by expressing the message that transracial adoptions are not second
best.
Kennedy's recommendations regarding race and adoption are on
the whole sound, including permitting adoptive parents to pursue their
own racial preferences in order to avoid placing children with parents
predisposed against them. Where he goes too far, however, is in his
willingness to prohibit consideration of race even if it were true "that
for the most part, black adoptive parents are better able to raise black
children than white adoptive parents'' (p. 412). My own opposition to
race matching is premised on the conclusion that the serious and
known costs to children of delayed adoption outweigh the speculative
and unsubstantiated risks of transracial adoption, especially given that
22. See pp. 434-36 (responding to the thoughtful and provocative argument by Professor
Richard Banks for prohibiting state child-placement agencies from accommodating adoptive
parents' racial preferences, see R. Richard Banks, The Color of Desire: Fulfilling Adoptive
Parents' Racial Preferences Through Discriminatory State Action, 107 YALE L.J. 875 (1998)).
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transracial adoption may offer certain benefits over inracial place
ments. Were serious risks from transracial adoption persuasively
substantiated, however, it would be difficult to justify ignoring such
risks if the interests of children are to remain a central concern in
child-placement decisions. Kennedy would reject reliance on such
"generalizations" on the ground that children should be treated as
individuals, and not as mere members of racial groups. The placement
of children, however, which involves predicting the likely success of
particular placements, necessarily involves generalizations about the
circumstances of prospective parents and child. Factors routinely
considered by placement agencies, such as the age, psychological
fitness, financial stability, and home environment of prospective
parents are based on generalizations grounded in experience and
social science. Individualizing the assessment involves taking as much
relevant information into account as possible, but the conclusions
drawn from such information necessarily involve reliance on generali
zations. Even the two exceptions in which Kennedy would permit race
to be considered - where an older child or the adoptive parents ex
press a racial preference - involve the generalization that holding
such preferences today will likely affect the future success of the
placement. Indeed, even the assumption that adoption is preferable to
institutional care, an assumption Kennedy apparently endorses, in
volves a generalization about the benefits of adoption over transient
care. Such a generalization may turn out to be inaccurate in particular
cases, yet taking it into account in the placement of children is not
only rational but commendable. Similarly, if transracial placements
were generally more harmful to children than inracial placements,
then the interests of those children would be served by taking race
into account, provided the generalization may be overcome when
other factors in a given case support a transracial placement. None
theless, given that race-matching proponents have failed to justify
their opposition to transracial adoption (as Kennedy persuasively
demonstrates), Kennedy's opposition to state-encouraged race
matching is well founded.
C.

Identity

Recurring throughout the chapters on sex, marriage, and adoption
are issues related to racial identity, the definition and categorization of
race by law, custom, and individual choice. Two chapters23 focus more
directly on racial identity by exploring the phenomenon of "passing."24
23. See chapters 7-8.
24. Kennedy 's research consulted much of the rich literature on the phenomenon of
passing. See, e.g ., p. 570 n.7 (citing LOUIS FREMONT BALDWIN, FROM NEGRO TO
CAUCASIAN, OR How THE ETHIOPIAN Is CHANGING HIS SKIN (1929); MARJORIE GARBER,
SYMPTOMS OF CULTURE (1998); SUSAN GUBAR, RACECHANGES: WHITE SKIN, BLACK
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Kennedy defines passing as the practice by which a person inten
tionally deceives others, by misrepresentation or omission, into
believing he is a different race from that into which societal conven
tions would define him (pp. 283-85). The practice of passing, over
whelmingly by light-skinned blacks passing as white, has occurred in
nontrivial numbers throughout American history. A number of moti
vations lay behind the decision to pass, and other motivations are
attributed to passers whether or not true. Such motives may, but need
not, involve a desire to be white or to reject blackness as inferior.
More common is the simple desire to gain the rights and benefits of
being perceived as white.
The stories of passing recounted by Kennedy reveal the heavy
burdens upon those who would pass and the families from which they
came. Passers had to be ever vigilant in concealing their racial identi
ties, often having to separate their lives from that of their biological
families. In one story (p. 312), for example, a son wrote a letter to his
mother in which he apologized for pretending not to recognize her
while passing her on the street with his white paramour. Passers who
were discovered faced hostile and often violent reactions, including
from the white families into which they had married. In some cases,
whites sought divorces or annulments after discovering the spouses
they thought they loved turned out to be black.25 Whites desperately
sought to prevent such infiltration of their ranks, including by hiring
blacks to help identify "white negroes" (p. 314). Blacks faced a
dilemma whether to "out" passers, whose deception may reflect a
rejection of blackness, given the risks to passers from revelation.
Although the great majority of passers were and are people of
color passing as white, some cases of whites passing as black have
recently emerged. Mark Stebbins, for example, a city council-member
representing a Latino and black constituency in Stockton, California,
was alleged by a political rival to be actually white (pp. 333-34). His
birth certificate said he was white, but he had concluded as a young
adult that based on certain physical features, he was black. He appar
ently held himself out as black thereafter, married twice to black
women, one of whom he met at an NAACP meeting, and engaged
FACE IN AMERICAN CULTURE (1997); ADAM LIVELY, MASKS: BLACKNESS, RACE, AND
THE IMAGINATION (2000); WERNER SOLLORS, NEITHER BLACK NOR WHITE: THEMATIC
EXPLORATIONS OF INTERRACIAL LITERATURE (1997); EVERETT V. STONEQUIST, THE
MARGINAL MAN: A STUDY IN PERSONALITY AND CULTURE (1937); GAYLE WALD,
CROSSING THE LINE: RACIAL PASSING IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY U.S. LITERATURE AND
CULTURE (2000); PASSING AND THE FICTIONS OF IDENTITY (Elaine K. Ginsberg ed., 1996);
G. Reginald Daniel, Passers and Pluralists: Subverting the Racial Divide, in RACIALLY
MIXED PEOPLE IN AMERICA 91 (Maria P. P. Roots ed., 1992); Robert Westley, First-Time
Encounters: "Passing" Revisited and Demystification As a Critical Practice, 18 YALE L. &
POL'Y REV. 297 (2000); and Kenji Yoshino, Assimilationist Bias in Equal Protection: The
Visibility Presumption and the Case of "Don't Ask, Don't Tell," 108 YALE L.J. 485 (1998)).
25. See pp. 295-97.
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in civil rights activism. Nonetheless, the allegations that he was
only passing as black resulted in his electoral recall. In Boston,
Massachusetts, two Malone brothers claimed to be black on employ
ment forms for the fire department in order to benefit from affirma
tive action. Ruling against them,· the personnel administrator deter
mined that the biological evidence was inconclusive, the firefighters
had never held themselves out as black elsewhere, and their identifica
tion as black was insincere. Kennedy approves the administrator's
apparent willingness to credit the Malones' claim to blackness
provided it was sincerely held, even if the biological evidence did not
support it. Such an approach reflects "the healthy intuition that a free
society ought to permit its members to freely enter and exit racial
categories - even for the purpose of gaining access to public entitle
ment programs - fettered only by the bonds of good faith" (p. 336).
Kennedy's examination of passing reveals the extent to which
America has sought to categorize people into fixed racial groups
determined by nature, morality, and law, but not by choice. The very
concept of passing is premised on the view that race is determined by
immutable standards, and thus the attempt to identify inconsistent
with those standards must reflect mistake or deceit. Whether under
stood as principally biological or socially constructed, conceptions of
race have been collectively imposed on individuals and the relation
ships they form. There has been recent movement, however, to
enhance personal choice over the definition of race. A multiracial
movement has gained ground in which people of mixed racial ancestry
assert the right to identify as such, the most prominent example
of which is golf superstar Tiger Woods's self-identification as
"Cablinasian."26 Despite the erosion of the "one drop" rule,27 people
of mixed heritage, especially involving black ancestry, continue
generally to be defined legally and socially as one race, and that of
inferior status. Moreover, the notion of complete freedom to define
one's race, such as a person with obvious black ancestry identifying as
white, remains untenable in America. Nonetheless, achieving such
freedom is Kennedy's aspiration. He argues that racial identity ought
to be exclusively a matter of personal choice, regardless of biology or
cultural convention, limited, if at all, by a requirement of good faith:
A well-ordered multiracial society ought to allow its members free entry
into and exit from racial categories, even if the choices they make clash
with traditional understandings of who is "black" and who is "white,"
and even if, despite making such choices in good faith, individuals mis
lead observers who rely on conventional racial signaling. Rather than

26. Woods coined the term to reflect his Caucasian, Black, Indian, and Asian ancestry.
See p. 143.
27. The widely followed "one drop" rule defined a person as black if he had any trace
able black ancestry. Seep. 223.
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seeking to bind people forever to the racial classifications into which they
are born, we should try both to eradicate the deprivations that make
some want to pass and to protect individuals' racial self-determination,
including their ability to revise stated racial identities. (p. 333)

I am troubled by the potential effect, at the present time, of leaving
racial identification exclusively to personal choice. A principal concern
I have is that permitting self-definition could seriously undermine
efforts to remedy past discrimination, and to monitor and deter
present discrimination. Measured by traditional definitions of race,
stark disparities persist between blacks and whites, most likely as a
result of the historical discrimination against people classified as black.
Only by using the same definitions can American society identify the
people likely disadvantaged by historical discrimination and determine
whether the effects of such discrimination have been remedied. If, for
example, whites could freely identify as black, then affirmative action
designed to benefit blacks as a means of remedying past discrimina
tion would be undermined to the extent whites not burdened by past
discrimination could claim opportunistically to be black. Additionally,
complete choice over racial identity could undermine antidiscrimina
tion laws. An employer could, for example, discriminate against
people who are black according to conventional standards, while
instead hiring whites who identify themselves as black. Under
Kennedy's conception of race, however, the employer could claim
accurately to have a racially diverse workforce.
Kennedy recognizes the risk to remedial policies, but notes that
white claims to blackness have been rare. This is hardly reassuring,
however, given that its rarity probably reflects· an assumption on the
part of most whites that it would be illegal and socially unacceptable
to claim to be black, or that such claims might be socially irreversible
along with the costs of being black in American society. If, in contrast,
custom and law expressly permitted racial self-definition, then many
more whites would likely claim to be black in order to receive prefer
ential benefits, only to redefine themselves as white for other
purposes.
Kennedy does suggest one condition on racial self-definition that
may ameliorate these concerns - a requirement of good faith. But
administering a good faith standard could create its own problems. For
example, would good faith require consistency, i.e., whatever race one
chooses must remain one's race for all purposes? While this may
reduce the risk of fraud, it would seem to undermine the freedom of
choice Kennedy advocates. Individual sovereignty over racial identifi
cation should include the right to change one's race as one chooses.
Alternatively, a condition of good faith could require courts and other
governmental actors to scrutinize the declarant's life to determine
whether he lived as the race he declared. This was part of the
approach taken by the personnel administrator in the Boston
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firefighters case (pp. 334-35). Again, however, this would seem to be
inconsistent with the choice to change one's race as desired and, more
troublesome, could involve courts in deciding whether particular
lifestyles comported with particular races. In determining whether one
lived as a black person, for example, would courts consider the kind of
community one chose to live in, the church one attended, or the race
of one's spouse? Indulging in such racial stereotypes would seem to
violate Kennedy's rejection of state- and community-imposed notions
of racial authenticity.28 Kennedy himself sharply criticizes a proposal
that birth certificates be required to include race to ensure against
fraudulently obtained affirmative-action benefits, noting that he would
prefer the elimination of racial preferences "if intrusive racial policing
were to become part of their price" (p. 337).
The only way to protect freedom of choice over racial identity
without intrusive governmental inquiries into the veracity of such
choices would be to give no legal significance to race. Indeed, this
would appear to be an implication of Kennedy's ideology, which he
comes close to accepting in the adoption context in which "[r]ace
dependent decision making . . . strengthens a reflex that we should
seek to overcome: the impulse to lump people together according to
gross (in this case, racial) classifications, which tend to cloud rather
than clarify our perception of the human virtues and vices in which we
should be most interested" (pp. 411-12). Kennedy acknowledges that
advocating colorblindness in the child-placement process could lend
political support to those opposed to affirmative action. While believ
ing the two race-conscious practices are distinguishable, Kennedy
concedes the risks of his argument and is willing to eliminate affirma
tive action if necessary for the elimination of race-conscious adoption
practices. And, as mentioned previously, Kennedy would abolish
affirmative action if guarding against fraud required state-imposed
racial identities. Ultimately, if personal choice over racial identity is to
be unfettered, the maintenance of state-sponsored policies that award
benefits according to race would seem to be untenable. No racial
discriminations by the state could be permitted.
At a more fundamental level, Kennedy's theory of racial self
definition is a radical departure from the historical meaning of race in
American society. Few Americans would accept that a person's race is
truly whatever one chooses. Even conservatives, who have in recent
28. Illustrative of associating lifestyle with race is Kennedy's description of Mark Steb
bins, the city-council member who was recalled for purportedly claiming falsely to be black.
Kennedy notes that, after young adulthood when Stebbins claims he decided he was black,
he devoted himself to civil rights causes and married twice to black women. P. 333. It is not
clear whether Kennedy cites these facts as evidence of Stebbins's good faith. The reference
to these facts nevertheless raises the question whether Stebbins's claim to blackness would
appear less sincere if he had married only white women or never engaged in civil rights ac
tivism. Kennedy's aversion to group-based standards of racial authenticity would seem to
require rejecting such an analysis.
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years taken up the mantle of colorblindness, assume that those
burdened by affirmative action are properly classified as white but
argue that the government should not take race into account. Addi
tionally, conservative support for racial profiling by law enforcement
suggests a belief that government may sometimes treat people
according to conventional racial categories regardless of the race peo
ple choose for themselves. Whatever one's views on state-sponsored
race-conscious action, few Americans of any political persuasion
would accept that people whose physical appearance and biological
heritage by conventional standards would define them as exclusively a
particular race could accurately claim to be whatever race they chose.
Such a concept violates the common understanding of race as an
objective, immutable, genetically inherited trait. Granted, as many
race scholars have argued,29 much of the significance of race is socially
constructed, but that construction has been built upon a physiological
reality of pigmentation and physiognomy. An understanding of race as
a purely subjective identity, regardless of appearance or ancestry, is
fundamentally different. At a minimum, Kennedy's views would re
quire the complete separation of race and state and, taken to their
logical end, would eliminate the concept of race altogether as a
socially relevant marker. Because the full implications of his reconcep
tualization of race are not certain, I am unable to endorse it. Moreo
ver, as previously stated, my desire to remedy past discrimination
cautions against his position for the short term. Nonetheless, the
potential effect in the long term of rendering race either irrelevant or,
like religion, a matter for private choice is certainly intriguing. At the
very least, the strong resistance his views will likely receive reveals the
depth of America's conception of race as an essential and immutable
classification into which we are born, . . . and die.
II.

INTRASEXUAL INTIMACIES

Kennedy's critique of historic laws and attitudes toward interracial
intimacies appears to be founded on a number of principles. They
include that intimacy between consenting adults of different races
should be valued and in any case is inevitable to the human condition;
that punishing or otherwise discouraging such intimacy is destructive
to people's lives; that scientific, religious, and moral justifications for
opposing interracial intimacy are unfounded or otherwise inadequate;
and that, ultimately, human flourishing and happiness are best
29. See, e.g., Ian F. Haney L6pez, The Social Construction of Race: Some Observations
on Illusion, Fabrication, and Choice, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 7 (1994); Deborah
Ramirez & Jana Rumminger, Race, Culture, and the New Diversity in the New Millennium,
31 CUMB. L. REV. 481, 483 (2001); Judy Scales-Trent, Women of Color and Health: Issues of
Gender, Community, and Power, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1357, 1363 (1991); Westley, supra note
24, at 307.
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promoted by legal and social tolerance of individual choice and
privacy in matters of intimacy and identity. The question suggested by
Kennedy's inquiry is whether the mistakes made and lessons learned
regarding interracial intimacies have implications for intrasexual inti
macies. To the extent state and societal constraints on personal choice
in this context are destructive to human happiness, Kennedy's inquiry
at least suggests a reason to evaluate the basis of such constraints.30
Striking parallels between current opposition toward intrasexual or
homosexual intimacies and historical opposition to interracial intima
cies justify comparing the two contexts. Opposition to homosexual
intimacy, like historical opposition to interracial intimacy, is rooted in
an ideology of nature. Same-sex relationships are commonly rejected
as unnatural or bestial, a violation of the biologically appropriate form
of sexual relations between man and woman. Relatedly, same-sex
relationships, like interracial relationships, have been considered a
product of mental defect, including by the psychological profession.
Although homosexuality has been declassified as a mental disorder,
people continue to assume that homosexuality is a product of genetic
defect or a result of traumatic childhood experience.
In addition to biological concerns are moral and religious objec
tions. Just as miscegenation purportedly violated God's will, sex and
marriage between homosexuals is commonly condemned as violating
the Bible or otherwise blasphemous. Others, who may disclaim
reliance on religious doctrine, nonetheless oppose same-sex intimacy
as morally repugnant or inconsistent with deeply rooted tradition.
Expressly linking the deviance of interracial sex with homosexuality,
the protagonist in one novel explained, "[i]t is a tragedy if a black man
lets himself love something in a white woman, just as it is if a man lets
himself get fucked by another man."31
30. I am not the first to observe similarities between discrimination against interracial
and same-sex relationships, particularly in the context of marriage. For sources defending
the analogy between antimiscegenation laws and bans on same-sex marriage, see, for
example, WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR., THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 153-63 (1996);
MARK STRASSER, LEGALLY WED: SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND THE CONSTITUTION 66-67
(1997); Andrew Koppelman, Why Discrimination Against Lesbians and Gay Men ls Sex
Discrimination, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 197 (1994); James Trosino, Note, American Wedding:
Same-Sex Marriage and the Miscegenation Analogy, 73 B.U. L. REV. 93 (1993). For sources
criticizing the analogy, see, for example, David Orgon Coolidge, Playing the Loving Card:
Same-Sex Marriage and the Politics of Analogy, 12 BYU J. PUB. L. 201 (1998); Richard F.
Duncan, From Loving to Romer: Homosexual Marriage and Moral Discernment, 12 BYU J.
PUB. L. 239 (1998); Lynn Marie Kohm, Liberty and Marriage - Baehr and Beyond: Due
Process in 1998, 12 BYU J. PUB. L. 253 (1998); Lynn D. Wardle, A Critical Analysis of Con
stitutional Claims for Same-Sex Marriage, 1996 BYU L. REV. l. Kennedy also notes some of
the ways in which attitudes toward interracial and intrasexual intimacies are similar,
although he does not develop these points. My purpose in this Part is to draw principally on
Kennedy's core observations and claims regarding interracial intimacies analyzed in Part I,
and consider what lessons they suggest for analogous restraints on intrasexual intimacies that
I identify.
31. P. 135 (quoting CECIL BROWN, THE LIFE AND LOVES OF MR. J!VEASS NIGGER 205
(1969)).
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The strength and scope of opposition to same-sex intimacy is also
reminiscent of antimiscegenation ideology. Recall that antimiscegena
tion laws were the most widespread and tenacious of segregationist
laws. Similarly, although discrimination against gays and lesbians has
diminished in recent decades, bans on same-sex marriage remain
universal, with only one state recognizing marriage-like unions.32
Notice, moreover, .that while the Republican-controlled Senate in 1996
fell just one vote short of protecting homosexuals· from .employment
discrimination, the same year saw Congress, with overwhelming sup
port from both sides of the aisle, pass the Defense of Marriage Act,33
which was signed forthwith by a Democratic President who had run as
a gay rights supporter.34 Animosity toward same-sex intimacy is also
characterized by a: visceral emotionality and tendency to violence.
Illustrated most infamously by the murder of Matthew Shepherd,
condemnation of those who would seek intimacy with people of the
same sex has involved a degree of hatred and cruelty expressed
through torture, mutilation, and castration, the brutality of which is
matched only by the lynching of blacks that produced the "strange
fruit" of the South. There is something about sex and intimacy in vio
lation of accepted norms, whether across racial or within sexual lines,
that provokes the deepest fears and violent rage.
Also apparent in the same-sex context, as with race, is the extent to
which intimacy, particularly expressed through marital commitment, is
more offensive than sexual conduct by itself. Consider, for example,
the extent to which laws against sodomy have been repealed or have
been rarely enforced against homosexuals compared to the political
activism to deny homosexuals the right to marry. Consider also that in
1986,35 although the Supreme Court upheld the criminalization of
homosexual sodomy, it did so by a bare majority, with subsequent
regrets by Justice Powell, and the Court firmly repudiated that prece
dent this past term.36 A constitutional challenge to bans on same-sex
marriage, in contrast, would most likely fall on deaf ears in the
Supreme Court. Thus, as of this past term, homosexual adults have a
constitutional right to consensual sex, but no constitutional or other
legal right in any state to be married. Consider finally the military's
"Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy.37 A service-member who has engaged
32. See Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999).
33. Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2000)).
34. See Carolyn Lochhead & David Tuller, Gays Hoping Clinton Will Do Better In 2nd
Term, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 12, 1996, at Al (describing enactment of Defense of Marriage Act
and Senate defeat of Employment Non-Discrimination Act); Nancy Mathis, President to
Address Gay Rights Group, HOUSTON CHRON., Nov. 8, 1997, at 1 (same).
35. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
36. See Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2484 (2003) (overruling Bowers as incorrect
when decided and incorrect today).
37. See 10 U.S.C. § 654(b) (2000).
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in sexual acts with a member of the same sex may defend against
expulsion by demonstrating his misconduct was out of character.38 The
mere attempt to marry a person of the same sex, however, with or
without sexual consummation, is irrebuttable grounds for expulsion.39
Sex is thus forgivable, provided it did not reflect an ongoing relation
ship or, worse, a desire to commit to each other for life.
Significant · to both opposition to interracial and intrasexual
marriage is a belief in the procreative purpose of marriage. Recall that
resistance to interracial marriage was based in part on the concern that
the offspring would be genetically or mentally defective. The concern
regarding same-sex marriage is similar, although not identical. The
concern is that same-sex unions are biologically incapable of produc
ing offspring. In both contexts, however, the restriction of marital
intimacy to heterosexual couples of the same race has been justified by
defining a central purpose of marriage as the healthy procreation of
the human species.
Although homosexuals are probably less likely to produce biologi
cal offspring, especially by both partners,40 they can form families with
children through adoption. Here too, however, the law discourages
intimacy with homosexuals. Desires by homosexuals to adopt children
have been legally prohibited or discouraged for reasons akin to
traditional and contemporary opposition to transracial adoption. In
addition to historical beliefs that interracial and same-sex intimacies
were immoral, unnatural, and even criminal, and therefore inappro
priate placements for children, opposition to adoption in both contexts
has more recently emphasized potential difficulties for the children as
a result of societal prejudice. With respect to race, transracial adoption
raises concerns about the negative reactions from society to the inter
racial nature of the family, and to the adopted status of the family, a
status more readily revealed by transracial adoption, and which
continues to be viewed by some, misguidedly, as a second-best alterna
tive to biological families. Race has also figured in custody disputes
between biological parents, in cases where one parent subsequently
enters an interracial relationship or where the disputing couple itself is
interracial and it is claimed by the black parent that the child's
interests would be served better by placement with the parent of the
"same" and more appropriate racial identity.
Similarly, concerns over adoptions by homosexuals center on the
potential difficulty to the child from societal prejudice toward the
38. See § 654(b)(l)(A).
39. See § 654(b)(3).
40. Whether advances in biomedical technology will enable homosexual couples in the
future to produce biological children jointly is uncertain. If such technology were developed,
the distinction between interracial and intrasexual marriage based on procreative grounds
would be further undermined.
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parents' sexual orientation. Having parents of the same sex also
suggests stigmatically that the child is not biologically related to at
least one of the parents. And in custody disputes between biological
parents, the fact that one of the parents has become intimately
involved with a person of the same sex has been grounds for prefer
ring the other parent. Finally, consider the question of identity in the
child-placement context. As Kennedy describes, opponents of transra
cial placement have complained that a black child raised by white
parents will fail to develop a healthy racial identity or, worse, will
develop a white identity. Adoption by homosexual parents has also
been resisted on the ground the child may have difficulty regarding his
sexual identity or, worse, may develop a homosexual identity.
Parallels can also be seen between race and sexual orientation
regarding issues of identity, especially the desire by some to conceal
their identities from others. Recall Kennedy's account of people who
"pass" as another race. In the sexual-orientation context, gays and
lesbians often "closet" their sexual orientation to guard against legal
and social sanction, or otherwise to experience the rights and privi
leges of heterosexual supremacy.41 Burdens similar to those faced
by passing blacks in guarding against discovery and in experiencing
reprisals when discovered continue to be experienced by homosexuals
in significant ways. Indeed, the toll on homosexuals may be worse.
Blacks who pass as white can express romantic affection for a white
spouse or lover at social gatherings or in public without revealing their
race or the interracial character of the relationship. For homosexual
couples, in contrast, concealing their sexual orientation from others
usually requires completely concealing the intimate nature of their
relationship while in view of others.
The phenomenon of concealment also raises political questions
for other members of the respective subordinated groups. Some
homosexuals question the motives of those who pass as straight, ques
tion whether sexual assimilation reinforces heterosexism, and question
whether "outing" them would serve the cause of gay rights. As
Kennedy describes, blacks have also faced political dilemmas of a
similar nature with respect to passing, including whether to reveal the
identity of passers. In fact, the dilemma whether to reveal passers'
identities in both contexts is prompted in part by the capacity of gays
and blacks to identify those who are, respectively, in the sexual closet
or racially passing. Many gays purport to be able to identify other gays
even when straight people cannot by use of so-called "gaydar."42
41. For an interesting exploration of the phenomenon of "gay passing," see Kenji
Yoshino, Covering, 111 YALE L.J. 769, 811-37 (2002).
42. See Mary Coombs, Interrogating Identity, 11 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 222, 232 n.57
(1996) (reviewing JUDY SCALES-TRENT, NOTES OF A WHITE BLACK WOMAN: RACE,
COLOR, COMMUNITY (1995)) (referring to "lesbians, and gays, apparent ability to recognize
each other by cues too subtle for heterosexuals - an ability sometimes referred to as
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Similarly, blacks often claim superior ability to identify blacks passing
as white. As Ralph Ellison explained, "most Negroes can spot a paper
thin 'White Negro' every time."43
The burdens of discrimination have been so great in both contexts
that some people have sought not merely to conceal their racial or
sexual identities, but to alter them permanently. Gays have sought,
with considerable difficulty, to make intimate relationships with the
opposite sex succeed, and have even resorted to psychiatric treatment
to become heterosexual. In the racial context as well, some blacks,
especially those light-skinned enough to pass, have denied their
blackness, even to themselves, and sought to change their race perma
nently through cosmetic treatments, and have even resorted to surgery
to appear more white. Fred Korematsu, for example, the subject of
the Supreme Court case upholding the military exclusion of
Japanese-Americans, had undergone plastic surgery to westernize his
appearance (p. 317).
Passing by homosexuals and blacks has also been motivated by a
desire to serve in the military, a context in which both groups have
been historically excluded. Gays continue to be excluded from military
service, although since the Clinton Administration only if they engage
in conduct that reveals their sexual orientation.44 Thousands of gays
nonetheless serve their country honorably by concealing their sexual
orientation. Similarly, blacks were historically excluded from military
service and later permitted to serve only on a segregated basis until
1948. Throughout American history, light-skinned blacks wishing to
serve in the military on the same terms as whites have attempted to
conceal their black identity. Kennedy recounts, for example, the expe
rience of Albert Johnston, a black physician whose light skin enabled
him to pass, who was interrogated by a suspicious naval intelligence
agent about his racial lineage. Johnston evasively answered, "Who
knows what blood any of us has in his veins?"45 Dr. Johnston subse
quently received a letter of rejection.. Apparently, at least with respect
to race, the military did not have a policy of "Don't Ask, Don't Tell."
A final parallel that Kennedy's inquiry helps to highlight is · that
opposition to interracial and intrasexual intimacy both involve
conduct-based discrimination. This point is worth emphasis because
discrimination against homosexuals is often distinguished from racial
'gaydar' "); see also Fine-tuning Your 'Gaydar, ' PHILA. DAILY INQUIRER, Nov. 5, 2002, at
C2; Turning the Gaydar on Survivor, ADVOCATE: NAT'L GAY & LESBIAN NEWSMAGAZINE,
Mar. 19, 2002, at 24.
·

43. P. 316 n.t (quoting RALPH ELLISON, SHADOW AND ACT 124 (1953)); see also id.
(citing Amy Robinson, It Takes One to Know One: Passing and Communities of Common
Interest, 20 CRITICAL INQUIRY 715 (1994)).
44. See 10 U.S.C. § 654(b) (2000).
45. P. 325 n.* (quoting w. L. WHITE, LOST BOUNDARIES 32 (1947)).
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discrimination on the ground the former involves conduct whereas the
latter involves status. Then Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Colin
Powell, for example, made this point in distinguishing the military's
exclusion of gays from racial segregation.46 .The ostensible distinction
between race and sexual orientation is that race is a trait that one
cannot choose or change, whereas homosexuality inherently involves
conduct that one can choose to avoid. Even if sexual "orientation"
itself is a status, provided discrimination against homosexuals is based
only upon expressions or actions revealing their sexual orientation, it
is purportedly distinguishable from discrimination against racial
minorities. What Kennedy's inquiry reveals, however, is the extent to
which America's racism included discrimination based on conduct,
discrimination we rightfully repudiate today. Punishment of interracial
relationships involved discrimination against those who engaged in
conduct of an intimate nature with a person of a different race.
Indeed, the reaction against people who engaged in interracially
intimate conduct was often more severe than that directed toward
blacks for simply being black. Similarly, in child-custody disputes in
which courts have removed children from custodial parents who inter
racially married, the courts' actions were in response to the custodial
parent's conduct. To make the point in the military context, imagine a
policy that permitted the races to serve on an integrated basis but
expelled anyone who attempted to marry interracially. While the
policy would avoid discrimination based on race alone, we would
nonetheless consider the policy racially discriminatory and wrong. In
deed, the Supreme Court upheld as compelling the government's in
terest in revoking Bob Jones University's tax-exempt status in
response to the university's policy of prohibiting .interracial relation
ships.47 Consider finally antimiscegenation · laws themselves, such as
those invalidated in Loving v. Virginia.48 Such laws constituted
conduct-based discrimination. Criminal prosecution required proving
the conduct of interracial marriage. Opposition to interracial and
intrasexual intimacies thus both involve discriminations based on
voluntary conduct of an interracial or intrasexual nature.
What insights can be gained from drawing the forgoing parallels?
They do not, without more, suffice to condemn opposition to same-sex
intimacy as comparably repugnant to segregationism. I acknowledge
the parallels may not be exact. Perhaps the scientific, religious, and
moral objections to same-sex intimacies are really justified, whereas
46. See 139 CONG. REC. 13,520 (1993) (statement of Sen. Coats) (quoting Colin Powell
as stating, "Skin color is a benign, non-behavioral characteristic. Sexual orientation is per
haps the most profound of human behavioral characteristics. Comparison of the two is a
convenient but invalid argument.").
47. See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
48. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
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the beliefs underlying antimiscegenation laws were unfounded, despite
the depth of sincerity with which segregationists held them. Perhaps
the fact that homosexuals cannot, as far as we know, create offspring
together differentiates antimiscegenation policies that were based on
faulty eugenics, although this justification is suspect to the extent the
law does not require heterosexuals to have the desire or capacity to
procreate as a condition of marriage and, indeed, the law could not
constitutionally do so. And perhaps societal attitudes against gay
couples justify legal restrictions on their right to adopt children,
although this does not explain why similar attitudes against interracial
couples "may be outside the reach of the law, but the law cannot,
directly or indirectly, give them effect,"49 or why the predictable
damage to children of parentlessness does not outweigh the specula
tive risks associated with adoption by homosexual parents.
Engaging these points is beyond the scope of this Review, but the
parallels between interracial and intrasexual intimacies suggest, at the
very least, that comfortable reliance on current notions of biological
appropriateness, religious interpretation, and moral tradition may be
tragically misguided or cruel. Consider that, despite the severe legal
and social restrictions against same-sex intimacies, such relationships
have developed throughout human history. Although not succeeding
in eradicating homosexuality, society has succeeded in causing misery
to those members of our national community with homosexual orien
tations. The extent to which science, religion, and morality provide, in
hindsight, inadequate bases for punishing interracial intimacies
between consenting adults calls into question the adequacy of such
justifications for punishing intrasexual intimacies between consenting
adults. The lessons learned from Kennedy's inquiry into interracial
intimacies should at least shift the burden to those who defend
society's punishment of same-sex intimacies, especially through the
coercive power of the state. Unless justifications can be advanced for
opposing same-sex intimacies that are more persuasive than those
used to oppose interracial intimacies; we should recognize that such
opposition may simply be a product of irrational fear and prejudice.
Perhaps the only real difference between interracial and intra
sexual intimacies is time. Both ideologies may simply reflect the
cultural norms of historical periods, not intrinsic moral truths.
Antimiscegenation laws are wrong by present standards, bans on
same-sex marriage are not. Perhaps, then, segregation was not wrong
when practiced, it has only become wrong as society has changed its
attitude towards it. For those who believe, however, that segregation,
including the legal and social punishment of interracial intimacy, was
49. Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984) (acknowledging that societal prejudice
against mother's interracial second remarriage could harm child but holding that law could
not give effect to such prejudice in determining child's custodial placement).
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wrong when practiced, then the punishment of those who love
intrasexually may likewise be wrong presently, whether or not society
understands it. The question then is how much time will it take before
societal attitudes toward intrasexual intimacies change, before
America escapes the moral myopia of the present generation? Which
generation will be able to claim, with the pride of the civil rights
generation of the twentieth century, "we did it." Which generation will
be able to ask, as Americans do today regarding slavery and segrega
tion, "what was wrong with America then?"
CONCLUSION

Kennedy closes his book by re-emphasizing his optimism in matters of race:
Commentary on race relations in the United States can be usefully di
vided into two broad traditions. One is a pessimistic tradition that doubts
either the wisdom or the possibility of achieving racial harmony on the
basis of racial equality . . . . Running counter to this current is an optimis
tic tradition that affirms both the wisdom and the possibility of bringing
into being a racially egalitarian society in which individuals may enjoy
their freedoms without racial constraint. . . . Although both of these tra
ditions figure prominently in the stories I have told in the previous pages,
it should be clear by now that I myself am firmly in the latter camp. (p.
5 1 9)

Kennedy's lesson of optimism also provides hope for the future of
intrasexual intimacies in American society, a hope Kennedy shares:
It is my own belief that the struggle to secure the right to marry
regardless of the genders of the parties involved will be won in the not so
distant future. That achievement, I am convinced, will represent a real
step up in the moral elevation of American democracy - a step facili
tated, in large part, by previous struggles over race relations. (p. 279 n. * )

Signs of progress are indeed evident. Just as restrictions on interracial
intimacies have loosened considerably over the last half century, the
rights of gays and lesbians to live free of . violence and discrimination
have gained ground in recent decades. Many local jurisdictions guar
antee rights against discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation,
and state-level protections are emerging as well. And the ability for
gays and lesbians to express their intimacies openly is increasing
significantly, especially in certain locales. That is not to discount
the serious discrimination still directed against homosexuals, but
to recognize the encouraging direction of change. Interracial
Intimacies should serve to encourage further change in the direction of
self-determination in matters of intimacy and identity with respect to
race and, by implication, with respect to sexual orientation. I applaud
the effort, and gladly add my voice to Kennedy's and to the many
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advocates of equality who raised their voice, when the risks of doing
so were much greater, to proclaim "Live and let live, live and let love."

